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Abstract
Background: The findings of the few studies that have to date investigated the way in which individuals with Anorexia
Nervosa (AN) navigate their social environment are somewhat contradictory. We undertook this study to shed new light on
the social-cognitive profile of patients with AN, analysing Theory of Mind and emotional functioning. Starting from previous
evidence on the role of the amygdala in the neurobiology of AN and in the social cognition, we hypothesise preserved
Theory of Mind and impaired emotional functioning in patients with AN.
Methodology: Thirty women diagnosed with AN and thirty-two women matched for education and age were involved in
the study. Theory of Mind and emotional functioning were assessed with a set of validated experimental tasks. A measure of
perceived social support was also used to test the correlations between this dimension and the social-cognitive profile of
AN patients.
Principal Findings: The performance of patients with AN is significantly worse than that of healthy controls on tasks
assessing emotional functioning, whereas patients’ performance is comparable to that of healthy controls on the Theory of
Mind task. Correlation analyses showed no relationship between scores on any of the social-cognition tasks and either age
of onset or duration of illness. A correlation between social support and emotional functioning was found. This latter result
seems to suggest a potential role of social support in the treatment and recovery of AN.
Conclusions: The pattern of results followed the experimental hypothesis. They may be useful to help us better understand
the social-cognitive profile of patients with AN and to contribute to the development of effective interventions based on
the ways in which patients with AN actually perceive their social environment.
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Introduction
Anorexia nervosa (AN) is a severe mental disorder characterised
by refusal to maintain body weight at or above a minimally normal
level for age and height, intense fear of gaining weight or
becoming fat, and disturbance in the way in which one’s body
weight or shape is experienced [1]. Up to 80% of sufferers
(predominantly females) engage in excessive exercise, in addition
to self-starvation, to reduce their body weight [2–3]. The etiology
of AN is not fully understood, but a crucial role is seemingly played
by the complex interplay among biological, genetic, psychological,
and socio-cultural factors [4]. AN has a prevalence of about 0.3%
in young women [5] and has the highest mortality rate among
psychiatric disorders [6]. Two forms of AN are described in the
DSM-IV [1], the restrictive subtype (AN-R) and the binge-purge
subtype (AN-BP). AN-R subtype refers to individuals who restrict
food without regularly engaging in binge-eating or purging
behavior (i.e. self-induced vomiting or the misuse of laxatives,
diuretics, or enemas) while the AN-BP subtype refers to individuals
who regularly engage in binge-eating or purging behavior. The
distinction between these two subtypes has been questioned by
authors that have performed longitudinal study indicating that the
migration from a diagnostic category to another is very common
between AN subtypes [7–8].
In sharp contrast to other psychiatric [9–13] and neuropsycho-
logical disorders [14–18], in which social-cognitive competences
have already been investigated extensively and for a long time,
only recently have researchers and clinicians started to investigate
the domain of social cognition in patients with AN. Social
cognition is the ability to construct mental representations of the
relations that exist between oneself and others and to flexibly use
these representations to function effectively in one’s social
environment [19–20]. Social cognition is a sum of different
processes and depends on the exchange of specific signals such as
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facial expression, body movement, and eye gaze [21]. Examples of
abilities referable to the domain of social cognition are both our
capacity to represent other people’s intentions and beliefs (i.e.
Theory of Mind) [22–23], and the capacity to share the emotions
and sensations of others (i.e. empathy) [24–25]. These distinct
capacities display different ontogenetic trajectories reflecting the
different developmental pathways of their underlying neural
structures and represent the bases of any interpersonal relations
[26–27].
The findings of the few studies that have to date investigated the
way in which individuals with AN navigate their social environ-
ment are somewhat contradictory. With regard to Theory of Mind
(ToM), Tchanturia et al. [28] assessed whether individuals with
AN show a deficit in their ToM ability by administering to 20
female participants with AN two ToM tasks–a story-comprehen-
sion task previously employed to study children with autism [29]
and a cartoon task previously employed to measure ToM in stroke
patients [30]. Their findings show that the proportion of
individuals who perform poorly on ToM tasks is higher among
women with AN than among matched healthy controls, but also
show that AN participants have impairments in both the ToM and
control tasks. The authors thus suggest no evidence of any selective
ToM impairment in AN sufferers. In a next study, Hambrook and
Tchanturia [31] have explored Machiavellian competence in AN.
Machiavellianism is the tendency to deceive and manipulate
others for personal gain, and correlates with high manipulative-
ness, insincerity, and callousness [32]. This competence is closely
connected to ToM ability, as it requires the comprehension of
others’ thoughts and intentions in order to predict how they will
behave and how one can manipulate them. To study Machiavel-
lianism in people with AN, Hambrook and Tchanturia [31] used
the Mach-IV, a self-report questionnaire composed of 20
statement items. Their results indicated no significant differences
between people with AN and healthy controls. In contrast with
these findings, more recently, Russell et al. [33] found ToM
impairments in the Reading the Mind in the Eyes task (RME, see
below for a detailed description of this task) in a group of 22
patients with AN. This last result was not replicated by Oldershaw
et al. [34], who did not find impaired performance in the RME
task in people with AN, but did find impairments in two different
versions of this task (the voice and films containing a social scene
versions). Interestingly, in two studies by Harrison and her
colleagues [35–36] people with AN performed poorer than
healthy controls on the RME task, while in a further work [37]
these authors found only a statistical trend (p= .091) toward a
significant difference between AN patients of the restrictive
subtype and healthy controls and no difference for the binge-
purge subtype.
Conflicting results were also found by Hambrook et al. [38].
They predicted that AN patients would display an empathising/
systemising psychometric profile similar to that found in people
with autism spectrum disorders. To this end, three standardised
self-report measures were administered: the Autism-Spectrum
Quotient [39], the Systemizing Quotient [40] and the Empathy
Quotient [41]. The results revealed that women with AN and
healthy controls did not differ in scores on either the Empathy
Quotient or the Systemizing Quotient, but at the same time, that
AN patients did report significantly higher total Autism-Spectrum
Quotient scores than did healthy controls. According to
Hambrook et al. [38], this latter result suggests that AN patients
experience difficulties similar to those found within the autism
spectrum disorders.
With regard to emotional functioning, Guttman and Laporte
[42], using the Interpersonal Reactivity Index [43], an
instrument for assessing four dimensions of empathy, did not
find any difference between AN patients and healthy controls;
however, empathy disorders were found in AN patients by
Gillberg et al. [44] on the basis of structured clinical interviews.
Interestingly, these two studies converge in ascribing to
individuals with AN alexithymic disorders, the single rather
well-established result in the AN literature concerning social
cognition [45–47]. Furthermore, although different studies have
found in people with AN difficulty recognising emotions from
facial expression and vocal tone [48–50], recently Rozenstein et
al. [51] have shown that patients with AN are as fast and as
accurate in matching both facial identity and facial emotions as
their unaffected sisters and unrelated healthy controls. In an
attempt to systematize this literature, Zucker et al. [52]
generated the hypothesis that individuals with AN fail to
process facial regions as a result of elevated levels of anxiety
around emotional experience that lead to prolonged avoidance
of salient facial cues, promoting inaccurate interpretation.
According to these authors, such chronic avoidance would lead
to decreased experience in the processing of faces and increased
dysfunction over time.
Faced with the discordant literature described above, we
undertook this study to shed new light on the social-cognitive
profile of patients with AN, analysing ToM and emotional
functioning. To this end, we used a set of validated experimental
tasks widely employed in the social-cognition literature: the
Reading the Mind in the Eyes (RME) test, the Empathy Quotient
(EQ), and the Twenty-Item Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20)
(see below for a detailed description of these tasks). Furthermore,
as a potential role of social support in the treatment and recovery
of AN was proposed [53], we also used the Multidimensional Scale
of Perceived Social Support (MSPSS) with the aim to explore this
proposal and to check for possible correlations between the social-
cognitive profile and the social support subjectively perceived by
the patients with AN.
The experimental hypothesis of the present study is based on
the neuroimaging and neuropsychological evidence that ToM
and emotional functioning are associated with overlapping but
distinct brain networks [54–56]. Common areas of activation
are the prefrontal cortex, the superior temporal sulcus, and the
temporo-parietal junctions. These areas form the basis for
making inferences about mental states [57–59]. However, the
appreciation of the emotional states requires the additional
engagement of emotional networks, and particularly of the
amygdala [55–56,60–61]. In fact, while the amygdala is not
involved in mentalising (i.e. ToM) per se [62] and is not
necessary for ToM expression [63–65], its role in processing
basic and social emotions, related both to the self and to others,
is well known [27,55,65–67]. Interestingly, an increasing
number of neuroimaging studies [68–77], adopting different
experimental paradigms, have shown structural and functional
alterations of the amygdala in people with AN and have
highlighted the crucial role of this brain structure in the
neurobiology of AN. Thus, starting from the neuroimaging
evidence according to which a) the amygdala plays a pivotal
role both in the neurobiology of AN and in all facets of
emotional processing, and b) the amygdala is not necessary for
ToM, in the present work we hypothesise that the performance
of patients with AN will be significantly worse than that of
healthy controls on tasks assessing emotional functioning (i.e. the
EQ and the TAS-20), whereas AN patients’ performance will be
comparable to that of healthy controls on the ToM task (i.e. the
RME).
Social Cognition in Anorexia Nervosa
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Methods
1. Ethics Statement
The study was approved by the Spedali Civili Hospital of
Brescia’s ethics committee and was conducted in accordance with
the Declaration of Helsinki. Written informed consent was
obtained from all participants, and written parental permission
was requested and received for participants under 18.
2. Participants
Thirty women diagnosed with AN according to the DSM-IV
[1] were recruited from the Regional Center of Eating Disorders
at the Spedali Civili Hospital of Brescia, Italy. Sixteen participants
fell into the restrictive subtype (AN-R), and 14 into the binge-
purge subtype (AN-BP) at the time of the study. Consensus
diagnoses were obtained from senior psychiatrists who assessed the
patients in clinical interviews and by use of the Structured Clinical
Interview for DSM-IV [78]. Exclusion criteria were comorbidities
of the following types: mental retardation, cognitive disorders,
psychosis, major depression, and personality disorders.
Thirty-two women were involved in the healthy control (HC)
group. Exclusion criteria for the HC group were the presence or
history of a neurological or psychiatric disorder, substance abuse,
or dependence. Furthermore, a HC participant was included in
the study only when she had both a Body Mass Index (BMI=Kg/
m2) between 18.50 and 24.99 (i.e. within the normal range of
weight according to the World Health Organization [79]), and a
score below the cut-off of 30 on the Eating Attitudes Test [80], a
standardised 40-item self-report scale measuring the risk of an
eating disorders. All the participants were native Italian speakers.
3. Procedure
All participants were tested individually in a quiet room. Testing
required one session lasting about 45–60 minutes. Tasks were
administered to all participants in random order. BMI was
calculated based on the weight and height of participants
measured on the day of testing.
4. Materials
4.1 Reading the mind in the eyes (RME) test. The RME is
an advanced ToM test measuring an adult’s mentalising ability
[81]. In the test, the experimenter presents a set of 36 photographs
of the eye region of various human faces. Participants are required
to choose among four words that are printed on the page that the
picture appears on, using the criterion of which word best
describes the mental state of the person depicted in the
photograph. Participants have unlimited time to decide, and a
glossary is provided. In order to pass this test, participants have to
put themselves into the mind of another person and recognize his
or her complex mental state, an ability that emerges around the
time of adolescence. In the gender-recognition control task,
participants are asked to judge the gender of the person in each
of the 36 photographs. For both experimental (mental state
attribution) and control (gender attribution) conditions, the
maximum score is 36.
The RME test is administrable in adults at least 16 years old.
For this reason, we excluded participants below this age from both
the AN and HC groups.
4.2 Empathy quotient (EQ). The EQ is a validated self-
report questionnaire for the assessment of the capacity to
empathize with other, i.e. to recognize another’s affective state
and to respond with an appropriate emotion to this [41]. The EQ
contains 40 empathy items and 20 filler items included to distract
the participant from a relentless focus on empathy. On each
empathy item a person can score 2, 1, or 0, so the EQ has a
maximum score of 80 (higher scores represent greater empathy).
The EQ is able to pick up considerable individual, gender, and
group differences, in both general-population and clinical samples.
4.3 Twenty-Item toronto alexithymia scale (TAS-
20). The TAS-20 is the most commonly used measure of
alexithymia, i.e. a deficit in the cognitive processing and regulation
of emotion, resulting in difficulties in describing and identifying
feelings [82]. The TAS-20 [83] is a validated self-report scale
comprised of 20 items. People being assessed are asked to rank
their own answers on a five-point Likert scale, with 5 indicating
the highest degree of agreement and 1 the highest degree of
disagreement with the affirmation expressed in each item. The
TAS-20 has a three-factor structure: difficulty in identifying
feelings (Factor 1, items 1, 3, 6, 7, 9, 13, 14), difficulty
communicating feelings to other people (Factor 2, items 2, 4, 11,
12, 17), and externally oriented thinking (Factor 3, items 5, 8, 10,
15, 16, 18, 19, 20).
The total alexithymia score is the sum of responses to all 20
items. The TAS-20 cut-off scores are as follows: #51 no
alexithymia, 52–60 borderline alexithymia, $61 alexithymia. This
scale has shown good internal consistency and test-retest reliability,
as well as convergent, discriminant and concurrent validity [84],
and it is currently one of the most utilised instruments in
alexithymia and emotion research.
4.4 Multidimensional scale of perceived social support
(MSPSS). The MSPSS [85] is a validated self-report measure of
subjectively assessed social support. This questionnaire provides
assessment of three sources of social support: family, friends, and
significant others. The MSPSS consists of 12 items, each scored on
a seven-point Likert-type scale, easy to understand (requiring just a
fourth-grade reading level) and suitable for young populations.
The maximum score is 84; higher scores indicate greater perceived
support. The MSPSS has been shown to be relatively free of
social-desirability bias [86].
4.5 Beck depression inventory, revised version (BDI-
II). The presence of symptoms related to depression was
evaluated by means of the BDI-II, a 21-item multiple-choice
self-rated scale [87]. The total score was obtained considering all
items, rated from 0 to 3. A total scores of 0–13 indicates minimal
depression, 14–19 mild depression, 20–28 moderate depression,
and, finally, scores higher than 29 are indicative of severe
depression.
4.6 Eating attitude test (EAT). The EAT [80] is the most
broadly used self-report questionnaire in the field of eating
disorders. The 40 items composing the EAT are presented in a six-
point forced-choice Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (never) to 6
(always). Of these response options, three are scored with 1, 2 or 3,
and the rest with 0. Total EAT score ranges from 0 to 120, and the
clinical cut-off point is usually considered to be 30.
5. Statistical Analyses
Data were analysed using the Statistical Package for the Social
Sciences (SPSS), version 18.0. Graphical and statistical exploration
of the data by means of box plots, histograms, Q-Q plots and
normality tests indicated a normal distribution of all measures;
hence, parametric tests such as the unpaired t-test and Pearson’s
correlation coefficients were used, as appropriate. All tests were
two-tailed and were conducted at the 5% level of statistical
significance.
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Results
Preliminary analyses revealed no differences between the
participants of the AN-BP subtype and those of the AN-R subtype
in any of the demographic, clinical, or experimental variables
considered, except for age (AN-BP=22.43, AN-R=17.38;
unpaired t-test, df = 28, t=2.473, p= .020), education (AN-
BP= 14.43, AN-R=12.13; df = 28, t = 2.384, p= .024) and
duration of illness (AN-BP= 5.86, AN-R=1.69; df = 28,
t=2.320, p= .028). These results are in line with those indicating
that the AN patients of the restricting type tend to have a shorter
duration of illness and to be younger (and consequently with less
years of education) than those of the binge-purge subtype, and
suggesting that the AN-R subtype represents a phase in the course
of AN rather than a distinct subtype [7–8]. For this reason, and
since no significant differences were found in any experimental
variables considered, we collapsed the two subtypes of AN into a
single group for further analyses.
Descriptive and Clinical Data
Participants’ demographic and clinical data can be seen in
Table 1. The two groups were comparable on age, years of
education and height. Self-evidently, there were statistically
significant differences for the weight and BMI variables. BMI
ranged from 12.27 to 17.79 in the AN group and from 18.56 to
24.61 in the HC group. The AN group was significantly more
depressed than the HC group, as measured by the BDI-II.
According to the cut-off scores of the BDI-II, 33% of the patients
with AN (10/30) had minimal or mild depression and 67% (20/
30) had moderate or severe depression, compared with 94% (30/
32) with minimal or mild depression and 6% (2/32) with moderate
or severe depression in the HC group (data not shown in table). All
of the participants in the HC group were well below the cut-off of
the EAT, with a minimum of zero and a maximum of 21.
Social-cognition Tasks and Social-support Questionnaire
In table 2 are reported the participants’ scores to the ToM and
emotional functioning tasks, and to the social-support question-
naire. For the RME, the number of correct responses for both the
experimental (mental-state attribution) and the control (gender
attribution) tasks were considered. Statistical analyses revealed the
absence of significant differences on both the experimental and
control tasks. The groups demonstrated significantly different
results for both the EQ and TAS-20 tasks, with AN patients
showing a lower degree of empathy and a higher degree of
alexithymia. According to the cut-off scores of the TAS-20, 17% of
the patients with AN (5/30) had borderline alexithymia and 47%
(14/30) had high alexithymia, compared with 9% (3/32) with
borderline alexithymia and no occurrence of high alexithymia in
the HC group (data not shown in table). The group of patients
with AN scored significantly higher than the HC group on all the
three factors of the TAS-20. This result remains significant also
after using the Bonferroni correction for multiple testing (.05/3).
Finally, compared to the HC group, a lower level of perceived
social support as assessed by the MSPSS was found in the AN
group.
Correlation Analyses
The correlation analyses for the AN group are shown in Table 3.
Given the exploratory nature of these analyses, there is no
correction for multiple comparisons. No significant correlations
were found between BMI, age of onset, or duration of illness and
any of the clinical or experimental tasks. Equally, no correlations
were found between the RME task and any of the other measures.
A positive correlation was found between TAS-20 and BDI-II,
whereas negative correlations was found between EQ and TAS-20
and between BDI-II and MSPSS. Interestingly, for what concerns
the MSPSS, a positive correlation was found with EQ and a
negative correlation with TAS-20, even when controlling for BMI,
BDI-II, age of onset, and duration of illness (partial correlations,
r= .593 p= .001 and r=2463 p= .017, respectively).
Discussion
The main aim of the present study was to investigate social
cognition in patients with AN. The pattern of results followed the
experimental hypothesis: more precisely, the performance of
patients with AN is significantly worse than that of healthy controls
on tasks assessing the emotional functioning (i.e. EQ and TAS-20),
whereas patients’ performance is comparable to that of healthy
controls on the ToM task (i.e. RME). Interestingly, correlation
analyses showed no relationship between scores on any of the
social-cognition tasks and either age of onset or duration of illness.
Our results are in line with previous studies showing emotional
functioning deficits in people with AN [44–47] and unimpaired
performance in the ToM domain [28,31]. On the contrary, we
Table 1. Demographic and clinical characteristics.
AN group Mean (SD) HC group Mean (SD) t-test results
(n =30) (n=32) (df =60)
Age, years 19.73 (6.06) 20.47 (2.72) t=2.623, p= .536
Years of education 13.20 (2.85) 14.13 (1.76) t=21.551, p= .126
Height (cm) 162.11 (5.03) 164.66 (5.95) t=21.814, p= .075
Weight (kg) 39.54 (4.57) 54.78 (4.72) t=212.916, p,.001
Body Mass Index (Kg/m2) 15.06 (1.74) 20.21 (1.45) t=212.668, p,.001
Age of onset 15.77 (3.74) – –
Duration of illness 3.63 (5.27) – –
EAT (maximum score = 120, cut-off = 30) – 7.59 (4.98) –
BDI-II (maximum score = 63) 26.40 (13.39) 8.94 (6.66) t=6.563, p,.001
HC=Healthy controls, AN=Anorexia nervosa, SD = Standard deviation, df =Degrees of freedom, cm= centimeters, Kg = Kilograms, BMI = Body Mass Index, EAT = Eating
Attitudes Test, BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory-II.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0044414.t001
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found divergent results from those of Russell et al. [33]: these
authors used the RME to test the ToM ability in a sample of 22
English female participants with AN and found that they
performed more poorly than the HC group. Although slight
cultural differences between their sample and the one investigated
in the present study (composed of Italian females with AN) may
have influenced responses to the RME at least to some degree, we
believe that the difference between the results of these two studies
is mainly due to methodological issues. First of all, in the study by
Russell et al. [33] there was a statistically significant difference
between the AN and HC groups on both mean age and years of
education. It is now well known that mean age is a particularly
important variable when assessing ToM ability with the RME, as
different studies have recently found age-related effects on
performance in this task [88–90] and a neuroimaging study has
demonstrated age-related differences in the neural activation
associated with the RME in adolescents [91]. Education is another
relevant variable, as it seems reasonable to expect that average
length of educational experience might potentially impact
understanding of the target word and the three foil words. Until
now, it has never been clearly shown that scores obtained on this
test do not strongly depend on the individual’s general intelligence
[92]; it has even been suggested that intelligence quotient may
predict performance on the RME in AN patients [34]. For these
reasons, we suggest that future research should pay particular
attention to the participants’ demographic variables, avoiding
comparisons between the performance of samples that are not well
matched for age or education. Furthermore, in the present study
we assigned to the HC group only participants with a BMI
between 18.50 and 24.99 (i.e. within the normal range of weight
according to the World Health Organization) and a score below
the cut-off of 30 on the EAT (i.e. without the risk of having an
eating disorder). In the study by Russell et al. [33] the HC group
had a mean BMI of 26.2, and no test to check for potential eating
disorders was administered to this group.
Table 2. Participants’ scores to the tasks assessing ToM and emotional functioning, and to the social-support questionnaire.
AN group Mean (SD) HC group Mean (SD) p value
(n =30) (n=32) (df =60)
ToM and emotional functioning tasks
RME experimental (maximum score = 36) 25.60 (3.93) 26.97 (3.33) t=21.484, p= .143
RME control (maximum score = 36) 34.20 (1.79) 34.69 (1.45) t=21.183, p= .241
EQ (maximum score = 80) 44.17 (11.47) 50.72 (8.35) t=22.584, p= .012
TAS-20 Global score (maximum score = 100) 56.70 (12.94) 40.47 (7.77) t=6.032, p,.001
TAS-20, Factor 1 (max. score = 35) 21.30 (6.61) 14.00 (3.19) t=5.954, p,.001
TAS-20, Factor 2 (max. score = 25) 16.80 (4.57) 12.06 (3.35) t=4.678, p,.001
TAS-20, Factor 3 (max. score = 40) 18.60 (5.63) 14.41 (3.56) t=3.528, p= .001
Social-support questionnaire
MSPSS (maximum score = 84) 68.27 (12.48) 75.03 (5.63) t=22.780, p= .007
HC=Healthy controls, AN=Anorexia nervosa, ToM=Theory of Mind, SD= Standard deviation, df =Degrees of freedom, RME =Reading the Mind in the Eyes,
EQ= Empathy Quotient, TAS-20 = Twenty-item Toronto Alexithymia Scale, EAT = Eating Attitudes Test, MSPSS =Multidimensional Scale of Perceived Social Support.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0044414.t002
Table 3. Pearson correlations in the AN group. Significant correlations are shown in bold.
BMI Onset Duration BDI-II RME TAS-20 EQ MSPSS
BMI –
Onset r= .103
p= .589
–
Duration r= .013
p= .947
r=2.136
p= .474
–
BDI-II r= .172
p= .363
r=2.277
p= .138
r=2.063
p= .740
–
RME r= .020
p= .917
r=2.178
p= .347
r= .301
p= .106
r= .102
p= .591
–
TAS-20 r= .173
p= .361
r= .146
p= .441
r=2.249
p= .185
r= .523
p= .003
r=2.059
p= .755
–
EQ r= .038
p= .840
r=2.139
p= .464
r= .302
p= .104
r=2.038
p= .844
r= .172
p= .365
r=2.471
p= .009
–
MSPSS r=2.270
p= .149
r= .084
p= .658
r= .200
p= .290
r=2.436
p= .016
r= .135
p= .478
r=2.587
p= .001
r= .539
p= .002
–
BMI = Body Mass Index, BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory-II, RME= Reading the Mind in the Eyes, TAS-20 = Twenty-item Toronto Alexithymia Scale, EQ= Empathy
Quotient, MSPSS =Multidimensional Scale of Perceived Social Support.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0044414.t003
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A further variable that may contribute to explain discrepancies
between our results on the ToM task and those of previous studies
is the duration of illness. While in our group of participants with
AN the mean duration of illness is well below four years, in the
study by Russell et al. [33] this variable exceeds nine years, as well
as in the studies by Harrison et al. [35–36] in which a statistical
difference to the RME was found. As suggested by Harrison et al.
[35], it is possible that their findings may be secondary to severe
weight loss and the starvation effects associated with AN and that
it would be a good idea to explore this question using a sample
with a shorter illness duration. We have followed this suggestion.
To the best of our knowledge, no previous studies have
investigated the ToM ability in an AN group with a shorter
duration of illness and thus the present findings contribute to
extend our knowledge on the relationship between this latter
dimension and the level of ToM ability in patients with AN. We
suggest that this relationship should be further investigated in
longitudinal studies that could properly test the hypothesis
proposed by Zucker et al. [52] according to which individuals
with AN are characterised by a chronic avoidance of salient social
cues (such as facial ones) that leads to increased dysfunction over
time.
We interpret our results also in light of the evidence of the
crucial role played by the amygdala in the neurobiology of AN. In
fact, numerous structural and functional neuroimaging studies
[68–77] point to the role of this cerebral region in emotional
processing and to its alterations in people with AN, supporting our
hypothesis of impaired performance among these people in the
tasks we used to assess emotional functioning. While the role of the
amygdala in determining the capacity to share emotional
experiences and to recognize emotions in oneself and others is
well known and acknowledged [55–56,66–67], the role of this
brain structure in ToM is very controversial and highly debated.
Indeed, although Baron-Cohen et al. [93] proposed the ‘amygdala
theory’ to explain autism (a neurodevelopmental disorder char-
acterised by ToM impairments), this theory has been subsequently
revisited by Dziobek et al. [63], who show that in autism the
amygdala is not crucially involved in social functioning, and by
Paul et al. [64] who by assessing two rare individuals with
developmental bilateral amygdalar lesions demonstrated that the
amygdala is not essential for the aspects of social behavior that are
diagnostically characteristic of autism. Furthermore, investigating
by means of a factorial design the interaction between the
emotional and perspective-tacking (ToM) factors, Ruby and
Decety [65] come to the conclusion that the amygdala is not
necessary for ToM expression. Anyway, it is worth noting that
with only one exception [94] none of the functional imaging
studies that have to date investigated the ToM brain areas
involved in solving the RME task report amygdala activations
[91,95–98] and that a lesion study examining two patients with
bilateral amygdalar damage reported impaired performance to the
RME in only one patient [99]. Overall, these findings seem to
support the hypothesis originally proposed by Gallagher and Frith
[62] according to which the amygdala is not involved in
mentalising per se, as well as our hypothesis of a preserved ToM
ability in patients with AN on the RME task.
Our results concerning perceived social support deserve
attention. They are in accordance with previous findings reporting
lower levels of perceived social support in patients with AN than in
an HC group [100] and showing no correlation between social
support and duration of illness [53]. Furthermore, to the best of
our knowledge, the present study is the first to demonstrate a
correlation between social support as perceived by AN patients
and emotional functioning. Although the nature of the present
study does not permit inference of cause and effect, this latter
result is particularly relevant, as it seems to suggest a potential role
of social support in the treatment and recovery of AN, and it
supports previous indications according to which interventions
designed to encourage patients to broaden their social networks
may be a useful addition to standard approaches based on a good
therapeutic relationship [53,101]. In particular, interventions
based on helping the patient to reflect on the impact her behaviors
have on the feelings of her carers and, contextually, based on
developing more effective methods for eliciting social support
might be recommended.
The present study has several limitations, however. First,
compared with other studies in this area, we enrolled a greater
number of patients with AN, but nonetheless, our study is still
limited by a relatively small sample size. Second, although there is
a strong amount of structural and functional evidence supporting
the crucial role of the amygdala in the neurobiology of AN, we
conducted no direct measurement of activity in this brain structure
in the patients of our sample. Third, the experimental tasks we
used elicit mainly reflective processes of social cognition. Further
studies should integrate this kind of task with others able to elicit
more automatic processes as well: as face regions outside from the
eyes can convey a number of socially relevant information, of
particular interest are the tasks concerning the evaluation of faces
expressing basic and social emotions [102–106]. Despite these
limitations, we believe the findings presented here may be useful to
help us better understand the social-cognitive profile of patients
with AN and to contribute to the development of effective
interventions based on the ways in which patients with AN actually
perceive their social environment.
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